NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 13 | Number 2

Article 13

2-1-1935

Injunctions -- Mandatory Injunction to Compel
Skyscraper Setbacks Required by Zoning Law
Herbert H. Taylor Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Herbert H. Taylor Jr., Injunctions -- Mandatory Injunction to Compel Skyscraper Setbacks Required by Zoning Law, 13 N.C. L. Rev. 233
(1935).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol13/iss2/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

no other method of proving his claim. The weapon of cross-examination and the good sense of the jury should sufficiently protect the estate
of deceased persons from mendacious claimants. 12 As cases previously
cited indicate, the statute has proved difficult to interpret and a great
source of expense and delay. To date this statute has come before the
North Carolina Supreme Court for interpretation two hundred and
sixty-two times, and as the instant case shows, its meaning is not yet
entirely clear.
In view of this confusion and the doubtful validity of the statute
in the first place, it is submitted that it should be abolished or at least
modified. 13 The necessity of interpreting such a statute leads the courts
into such peculiar positions as that of the Michigan court in a recent
automobile negligence case. 14 The words of the Michigan statute render
the surviving party incompetent to testify as to any facts "equally
within the knowledge" of the witness and the deceased. 15 The defendant driver wished to testify that he blew his horn; this evidence was excluded under the statute. On appeal the upper court held that the
evidence should have been submitted to the jury but with instructions
that if they found the deceased heard the horn, so that it was equally
within the knowledge of the parties, they were not to consider it. In
other words, the effect of the court's holding is that if the defendant
blew his -horn loud enough to do any good-i.e., so that the deceased
could hear it-then the jury could not consider it, but if he blew his
horn, but only ineffectually, then the jury could consider it.
F. M. PARKER.
Injunctions-Mandatory Injunction to Compel Skyscraper
Setbacks Required by Zoning Law.
Defendant erected a twenty-story apartment building separated by
an alley from the four-story apartment buildings of the plaintiffs, in violation of a Chicago zoning ordinance requiring certain setbacks according to height. The building permit had been granted over the objections
of the plaintiffs, under a section of the state zoning act which gave the
zoning board of appeals the power to vary the requirements of the ordinance. The state Supreme Court, in litigation carried on by these
plaintiffs, subsequently had held that section of the act unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs had then sought a mandatory injunction in a Federal District
Court to force the defendants to reconstruct the building, which had
-been completed in the meantime, so as to make it conform to the zoning
' St.
John v.for
Lofland,
5 N..D.
140, 64 N. W. 930 (1895).
Proposals
Legislation
in North
Carolina (1932) 11 N. C. L. REv. 51, 61.
" tNoonan v. Volek, 246 Mich. 377, 224 N. W. 657 (1929).
ComP. LAws (1929) §14219.
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ordinance. The District Court relying on the impropriety of causing
great injury to the defendant, in order to award an inconsequential
benefit to the plaintiffs, refused relief. On appeal, held, reversed and
mandatory injunction granted.1
2
There seems to be only one other case, that of Bouchard v. Zetley,
in which a mandatory injunction was granted to an individual to compel
compliance with a zoning ordinance.8 There the defendant, having
obtained a building permit, in spite of prompt notification by the plaintiff, an adjoining property owner, that the proposed apartment buildings
would violate the setback provisions of the zoning ordinance, proceeded
with the construction of the buildings. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that the trial court properly granted a mandatory injunction to
require compliance with the ordinance by destroying part of the buildings, in view of public interest in the enforcement of the ordinance, notwithstanding the claim that plaintiff could have been compensated by a
money judgment.
In cases of encroachments 4 and violations of restrictive covenantsu
the courts will sometimes balance the conveniences, but as each case is
decided on its own peculiar circumstances any rule that could be formulated would be too general to be useful. However, the courts consider
the following factors particularly: (1) The character of the defendant's
attitude and conduct; ie., whether based on innocent or negligent mistake, good faith, wilfulness, etc.; (2) whether plaintiff was guilty of
laches, waiver, or acquiescence; and (3) the relation of the injury that
the defendant would suffer from the injunction to the benefit that it
'Welton v. 40 East Oak St. Building Corporation, 70 F. (2d) 377, (C. C.
A. 7th, 1934); cert. denied, 55 S. Ct. 105 (1934), sub. non. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., trustee v. Welton.
'Bouchard v. Zetley, 196 Wis. 635, 220 N. W. 209 (1928).
'Although it is firmly established that an adjoining property owner has the
right to an injunction to restrain the violation of a zoning ordinance, provided he
shows special damages. Shelton v. Lentz, 191 Mo. App. 699, 178 S. W. 243
(1915) ; Holzbauer v. Ritter, 184 Wis. 35, 198 N. W. 852 (1924). But cf. O'Brien
"v.Turner, 255 Mass. 84, 150 N. E. 886 (1926).
In Goldsboro v. Supply Co., 200 N. C. 405, 157 S. E. 58 (1931), the nearest
North Carolina case to the point, it was held that a complaint by property owners
to enjoin construction and operation of a filling station in violation of a zoning
ordinance, alleging threatened irreparable injury to property, was not demurrable
for failure to show authority to sue.
'Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Wire Co., 203 Mass. 448, 89 N. E. 534 (1909)
(refused to balance equities). Goldbacher v. Eggers, 38 Misc. Rep. 36, 76 N. Y.
S. 881 (1902), aff'd in 82 App. Div. 637, 84 N. Y. S. 1127 (1903), aff'd in 179
N. Y. 551, 71 N. E. 1131 (1904) (equities balanced). See annotation in (1921)
14 A. L. MZ831, continued in (1924) 31 A. L. R. 1302.
But cf. Shrago v. Gulley, 174 N. C. 135, 93 S. E. 458 (1917) (the nearest
North Carolina case to the point, indicates that injunctive relief in the case of an
encroachment might be applicable under some circumstances).
IBauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 139 AtI. 508 (1927) (balanced equities);
,Hartman v. Wells, 257 Ill. 167, 100 N. E. 500 (1912) (refused to balance equities).
See annotation in (1928) 57 A. L. R. 336.
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would give to the plaintiff. To these the Bouchlrd case would seem to
add another factor, that of public interest in the enforcement of zoning
ordinances. Judged by these criteria, the instant case seems to have
been properly decided. Defendant, relying upon the variation permitted
by the zoning board of appeals, erected the structure in defiance of the
ordinance and despite the protests and legal actions of plaintiffs. It
should not be fatal that they did not in addition seek a restraining order
pending the outcome of that litigation. Although it was estimated that
it would cost the defendants around $350,000, of which $130,000 would
go into rebuilding, to make the building conform, and that the resulting
benefit to the plaintiffs from the setbacks would be an average increase
in light of 2.14%, this balancing of conveniences perhaps ought not to
prevail against the other factors. Nor should the interests of bondholders, though their security is thus impaired.
There is, however, one objection to the result reached, and that is
the possibility of inducing extortion. What happens after the granting
of such a mandatory injunction? Is the building made to conform to the
ordinance, or is the plaintiff bought off by a larger payment of money
than would be granted by a court as damages? If the latter seems likely,
the plaintiff should be deprived of his argument of public interest, and
also of the inadequacy of the remedy at law. There are, however, two
possible precautions: either by provision in the decree that once arf
injunction issues no compromise would be allowed, or by restricting the
enforcement of ordinances by injunction to suits brought by the zoning
HERBERT H. TAYLOR, JR.
officials. 6
Injunctions-Restraining Residents of Forum from Suing in
Foreign Courts to Evade Local Laws.
A contract of employment was executed by residents of Illinois.
During the course of employment the employee was killed in Missouri.
His admiistratrix filed a claim with the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission. In a suit brought by the employer in a Federal District Court for Missouri to enjoin the Commission from entertaining
jurisdiction and to restrain the claimant from prosecuting her proceeding, held, decree for plaintiff, injunction allowed.'
I This was the view of the District Court. Compare note 3, supra. In North

Carolina, under statutory authority, a city may enjoin the violation of its zoning
ordinance. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §2776 (y) ; Elizabeth City v. Aydlett,
200 N. C. 58, 156 S. E. 163 (1930). But in the absence of statute, equity will not
at the suit of a municipality, enforce municipal ordinances by injunction unless
the act sought to be restrained is a nuisance. Ventnor City v. Fulmer, 92 N. J.

Eq. 478, 113 Atl. 488 (1921), aff'd in 93 N. J-. E. 660, 117 Ati. 925 (1922);
Elizabeth City v. Aydlett, 198 N. C. 585, 152 S. E. 681 (1930).
1
Joseph H. Weiderhoff, Inc. v. Neal, 6 F. Supp. 798 (W. D. Mo. 1934).

